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The paper investigates whether the current decline of the Italian economy could be traced back to ¯nancialization.
In principle ¯nancialization could not be so important for an economy in which many ¯rms are not quoted in the
stock exchange and for which shareholders' interests should not matter. The author argues that ¯nancialization may
have deep e®ects in such an environment by changing the perceived ¯nancial norm and the target return on capital.
The author draws on a model by Lavoie (1995) extending it to an open economy. She uses this model by looking at
the e®ects of an appreciation, thus replicating the appreciation of the euro in the last years and its possible e®ects
on the Italian economy. The results of such an appreciation would be a fall in the rate of growth, accumulation and
in the realized rate of pro¯t. This picture, however, does not ¯t in well with some stylized facts. In Italy, the rate
of growth and the capital accumulation have slowed down while the rate of pro¯t and the pro¯t share have clearly
increased. The increase concerns the average pro¯t share and the average pro¯t rate while indeed the pro¯t rate
is declining in the manufacturing sectors, but rising in the services sector. At this point a di®erent interpretation
is presented, which is no more based on the ¯nancialization hypothesis but rather on the increase in the degree of
monopoly power in the Italian industrial sectors, given the increase in the mark-up. This process would have been
favoured by the privatization process of previously public enterprises. The author shows what might have happened
by using a model by Dutt (1995) with two sectors. In this model in the long-run the accumulation of capital is still
governed by aggregated utilization and pro¯tability, but the allocation of capital among sectors and their growth
depends on the pro¯t rate di®erential. The pro¯t rate di®erential might have shifted resources to the service sectors,
which would have been favoured by the privatization process. In this case, ¯nancialization would be a consequence of
the increase in monopolistic competition, which in turn could be responsible for the decline.
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The recent performance of the Italian economy has been very weak. The main stylized facts are
the slow growth of output and investment, the fall in the export share, and the worsening in the
distribution of income, the fall in labour productivity. Many explanations have been proposed,
though mainly on the microeconomic level. In what follows I will deal the issue whether Italy's bad
economic performance is related to ¯nancialization, having the country at the same time entered
in a phase of deep structural changes involving both trade and ¯nancial liberalizations. In the ¯rst
section I will give a brief review of the recent literature on ¯nancialization, from the macroeconomic
side, to see whether this approach could be applied to the Italian case. In the second section I will
show the main trends in macroeconomic aggregates and distribution of income in Italy and discuss
the debate on these themes. In third section I will propose a very simple model of ¯nancialization,
which could eventually apply to the Italian case. In that model, ¯nancialization would work through
an increase in the target rate of return. The conclusions of that model, however, do not ¯t well the
Italian case. In the last section I will examine another story, mainly dealing with monopoly power
and classical competition among capitals. According to the last story ¯nancialization, interpreted as
changed attitude of ¯rms towards investment, share issue, dividends, might be a consequence rather
being the origin of the problem. Conclusions will follow.
1 Financialization in macroeconomic models.
In the macroeconomic literature on the ¯nancialization there are two main settings. Either ¯nan-
cialization is de¯ned as a growing rate of return on ¯nancial assets relative to real assets, that is an
increase in the real long term rate of interest or in the yield of ¯nancial activities. Another strand
of literature, fast growing in the last year, deals with the change in the corporate governance of
enterprises, the so-called shareholder value orientation. In particular it focuses on the increase in
the dividends distributed, on the fall in the rate of issue of new shares and on the repurchase of
their own shares by enterprises. These changes are incorporated in standard macroeconomic models
and their e®ects on the accumulation of capital and its pro¯tability are examined (see Stockhammer
2005-2006, Skott and Ryoo 2007, Hein and van Treeck 2007, Aglietta-Breton 2001, Boyer 2000).
In Kaleckian models the usual investment and saving functions are re-written by taking into
account those changes and the usual comparative statics derivatives are calculated. They show
what happens to the endogenous variables of the model with respect to a change in the shareholder
orientation. Since this change a®ects both the investment and saving functions, the result is that an
equilibrium between saving and investment at a higher level of output is possible provided that the
decrease in investment is compensated by an increase in consumption out of wealth (coming from
the increase in distributed dividends). If instead the propensity to consume out of wealth is low, a
lower accumulation rate will prevail.
Most of the arguments used can be represented graphically by means of a diagram in the rate of
pro¯t is a function of rate of growth of saving and of investment. (see Lavoie 1995). To a certain
equilibrium between saving and investment corresponds a certain equilibrium rate of pro¯t. If the
curves shift then a new equilibrium point will be reached at a higher or lower rate of growth of
saving and investment and a new equilibrium rate of pro¯t will result.
By means of this graphical representation the main supposed changes related to ¯nancialization
are examined. The so-called shareholder value orientation is simply represented as a downward
shift in the investment function. Other things being equal this means a lower saving-investment
equilibrium and a lower rate of pro¯t.
The other changes are an increase in the dividend rate. This is simply accounted for by assuming
that dividends are a negative item in the saving function of entrepreneurs, which at least in some
models are the unique ¯gures to save. If those dividends however are used to demand more goods
consumption will increase as well.
As Skott and Ryoo (2007) point out, if a change in the new issue policy and a decrease in retained
earnings are the main consequences of ¯nancialization, in this type of models the only e®ect on the
rate of accumulation and the rate of pro¯t must be positive. In fact, all these things simply amount
1to a reduction in the saving ratio. However, in models where capacity is underutilized and labour
supply is elastic, a reduction in the savings ratio will increase aggregate demand and output.
If all these things happen, according to the most common de¯nition of the investment function,
the investment curve should shift upwards too. In fact the pro¯t share rises, the ratio of price of
shares to reproduction cost of capital rises too, the rate of utilization rises as well. Then in such
a context investment should increase too. Empirically however this does not happen and then to
reach the desired conclusions one has to assume that, though investment is a function of all these
things, the relative parameters are very low and that shareholders value orientation simply means a
downward exogenous shift in the investment function.
For example, in the model by Stockhammer (2005-06) it is assumed that shareholders prefer
pro¯ts to growth and this is embedded in the production function. A growing weight of shareholders
means that a point in the preference function of ¯rms where higher pro¯ts and lower investment
is chosen. As Skott and Ryoo (2007) write, in this case rather than explaining the stylized facts
they are simply assumed as basis for the analysis. In this model the outcome of a lower growth of
investment and a higher rate of pro¯t is simply supposed to exist and introduced in the production
function rather than explained by the model.
In Hein and van Treeck (2007) dividends are explicitly introduced in the saving function of the
entrepreneurs and an increase in them has a depressive e®ect on output if the propensities to consume
out of wealth are low. Hein and van Treeck (2007) consider whether the increase in dividends will be
transferred to prices or not. According to di®erent parameter values an outcome, which is compatible
with the stylized facts of higher pro¯ts and lower investment, can occur. This happens when, the
increase in capacity utilization notwithstanding, the ¯rms decide not to invest given the weight of
the dividends distributed. Thus capacity utilization and pro¯ts are high while investment grows at
a low rate. The high capacity utilization is due to the higher demand, which stems out of wealth
e®ects as usual. Thus both the pro¯t rate and the rate accumulation move parallel to each other, as
in all the models based on steady state growth in the Cambridge tradition. Only investment grows
less, that is the rate of pro¯t may be lower than the rate of change in the capital stock. In most
models, as Skott and Ryoo (2007) point out, is not clear what happens to the prices of shares and
why Tobin's q does not work , Boyer (2000) keeps it ¯xed and Stockhammer (2005-06) does not
consider it at all.
The problem is that, if shareholder value orientation simply means a shift in the investment
function, one wonders then why to have such an investment function? If, as is commonly assumed,
investment is rather insensitive to increases in the share of pro¯ts, capacity utilization and the q
ratio, then the next question to ask is for how long an expansion fuelled only by consumption may
last. In middle-run models this question may be ignored but the same is not true in the long run.
The assumption of the shareholder value orientation is simply used as a deus ex machina to make
the models match the empirical evidence. In practice, this amounts to denying any validity, under
the present historical conditions, to the investment functions. Then why do we still use them?
Another issue is how changes in the dividend and new issue policies of corporations are introduced
in the analysis. Though most of the scholars dealing with the issue of ¯nancialization refer to
Lazonick's de¯nition of the present era as one of \downsize and distribute" rather than \retain and
grow", nobody asks how these increased pro¯ts to be distributed are obtained. The underlying
assumption is that the share of retained pro¯ts falls as to allow a greater part of them to be
distributed. The question which is not on the agenda is how the increase in the pro¯t share and rate
has been obtained. The question answered instead is what happens if a greater part of pro¯ts is not
retained within the ¯rm but distributed as dividends to the shareholders. But a sensible assumption
would be that the target rate of return of enterprises has increased. Moreover if they downsize this
has important implication on the composition of aggregate demand. The most common consequence
is a fall in the level of wages paid. Thus opposite tendencies prevail at the top and at the bottom of
the production chain. At the top concentration increases while at the bottom increased competition
depresses wages (see Milberg 2006). All these things are neglected in the most used aggregate
models, which are by de¯nition one sector models.
In the rest of the paper, which refers to the present situation in Italy, the issue of ¯nancialization
is dealt in an open economy context by focusing on the increase in the target rate of return of
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world level, the opening of the economy to foreign trade, the privatization of public enterprises, the
change in the regulation of labour markets. Thus the e®ect of shareholder orientation on dividends,
new issue etc is ignored in the ¯rst stance.
2 Changes in income distribution and slow growth: the case
of Italy.
The present state of the Italian economy is not encouraging. The country is often described as being
in a state of economic decline. There is no agreement however of what is meant by this word. The
most common mentioned circumstances are the slow growth of output and capital accumulation, the
fall in the productivity of labour and the fall in the share of exports. Moreover in the last decade
there has been a shift in the distribution of income with a rise in the share of pro¯ts and a fall in
the share of wages. All this has happened just when the Italian economy has undergone a process of
¯nancial opening, trade liberalization and internal economic reforms aiming at improving e±ciency
and performance. Among the latter the most important one has been the privatization of previously
state owned enterprises. The introduction of the euro and its appreciation until now has contributed
to the di±culties encountered by the exporting industries.
At the same time the economy has experienced a process of de-industrialization and tertiarization
common to many other European countries but with some peculiar characteristics. The weight of
the industrial sector calculated as percentage of its value added to the gross national product had
decreased while that of various types of service sectors has increased. In the last years this process
has accelerated and now the industry account for roughly 30% of GdP.
At the same time a change in the distribution of income has happened. The share of wages has
fallen while that of pro¯ts has increased. The fact has been empirically ascertained by a number
of recent studies ( Levrero and Stirati 2005, Prezioso 2005, Torrini 2005a,Torrini 2005b, Daveri and
Lasinio 2005). The methodology employed in these studies is di®erent but this notwithstanding the
results are the same. In what they di®er is the interpretation of the results. Torrini (2005b) and
Daveri-Lasinio estimate a neoclassical production function, which could allow for changing factor
shares. Prezioso (2005) calculates that the wage share has fallen ¯ve percentages points in the last
twenty years. The fact is remarkable because during the same period total employment has been
rising by 21.1%. Levrero and Stirati (2005) calculate also the wage share for the same period and
¯nd a fall in it and also they calculate the rate of pro¯t by dividing the pro¯ts by the value of capital
and ¯nd a rise in it which is particularly remarkable for the services sectors.
Prezioso (2005) calculates the mark-ups for two series of prices, consumption good prices and
industrial products. In the industrial sectors the mark-up over variable costs has decreased. This fall
however has not bene¯ted workers because ¯xed costs have increased, namely the costs of scrapping
old machinery and replacing it with new one. The average time use of plants has greatly decreased.
The mark-up so has not increased, though the rate of increase of prices has been higher that of
labour costs. Notably the price of exports in Italy has been higher than that of foreign competitors,
even European ones. The rate of growth of industrial prices has been higher than that of the same
goods in France, Germany and Spain. The conclusion that Prezioso draws is that the rise in the
mark-up has contributed to the slow growth of output since the average propensity to save out
of pro¯ts is usually lower that that out of wages. In Kaleckian types of models the value of the
multiplier falls as the mark-up rises (for a restatement of this proposition see Vera 2006). To this it
must be added that the main sources of output growth in the same period have fallen, namely state
expenditure and exports. State expenditure has been cut to reduce the debt and meet European
targets, exports fell because of the decline in the industrial sector. Thus aggregate expenditure has
been reduced and the multiplier though the rise in mark-up too. The lower expenditure has had a
smaller e®ect than in the past on output.
Levrero and Stirati (2005) o®er the same type of empirical evidence as to the changes in distribu-
tives shares. They o®er a slightly di®erent explanation of the fall in the pro¯t share of the industrial
sector with respect to that of the services sector. They argue that to the di®erent market structures
3in the two sectors, the industrial sector operating in condition of full competition the other sector
under monopolistic conditions. They argue that, if the mark-up and then the pro¯t rate increases in
one sector, whose products are used as inputs by the other sector, the pro¯t rate in the latter must
necessarily decline independently from the di®erences in the market structure. This would happen
just because of input-output linkages. Many scholars also claim that the loss of competitiveness of
the Italian exporting industries is due to the higher prices of the services employed in the production
of industrial goods and thus to the ine±ciency of the non traded sectors, which are not exposed
to international competition. However, a closer examination of the weight of intermediate inputs
from these sectors over total costs of the industrial sector cast some doubts on this explanation (see
Schiattarella 2007). The same result has been reached by using a di®erent method by Daveri and
Lasinio (2005).
Another open issue is the source of higher mark-up in the services industries. Services is a
wide sector where there are both traditional low productivity sectors and modern industries. The
productivity of labour in those sectors has been always lower than in traded good sector and in the
last years has declined further. However the mark-ups are also high in industries which have been
privatized and have a high productivity of labour such as telecommunications, banking and ¯nance
and new services to enterprises. For the branches, whose productivity has fallen, the higher mark-up
comes out from recharging on prices the increase in costs; for the other more e±cient ones, the high
mark-up comes out from the choice of not granting to labour its share of productivity improvements.
This could ¯t well the motivation given in the ¯nancialization literature. The owners and controllers
of those big ¯rms aim at a high stock market valuation and to get it they have to show high net
pro¯t ¯gures in their balance sheets. They need also to have high margins to be able to distribute
dividends. High pro¯t margins and high dividends are also necessary to be able to resell the ¯rm
with a capital gain after some time (see Telecom).
As a matter of fact, the return on capital has been higher in the newly privatized industries,
irrespective of their belonging to the manufacturing or service sectors. Torrini (2005b) calculates
the return on capital is calculated as the pro¯ts net of depreciation divided by capital value at
replacement costs. He ¯nds out that , starting from a base value of 1.00 in 1989, the rate of return
on capital in the manufacturing sector has been falling throughout the period 1989-2001 reaching
0.52 in 2001, while, over the same period, it has been rising from 1.00 to 2.21, 1.65, 1.30 respectively
in the three sectors energy, transportation and ¯nance (see Torrini 2005b table 5 p.24).
In this case, though the ratio of price of shares to the cost of reproduction of capital (Tobin's
q) rises, no increase in investment occurs because the required high rate of return is possible only
in high oligopolistic sectors where entry is legally regulated and requires enormous ¯nancial means.
The option of setting up a new ¯rm rather than acquiring an existing one is not available in these
cases. This means that investment is replaced by mergers and acquisitions which in turn require
high borrowing. Further those mergers and acquisitions boost the price of shares of the ¯rms to be
acquired. In the traded goods sector the labour saving technical progress may displace workers while
in the non traded sectors the expansion of overhead labour may increase employment, though only
for low skilled workers. The combination of all these changes may cause a shrinking of the labour
share and a rise in the average rate of pro¯t without an increase in the rate of growth of output.
The increase in the target rate of return in one sector according to Lavoie and Ramirez (1997)
should decrease the rates of accumulation and the rates of growth in all sectors both in the short
run and in the long run. The model however is a model where capital accumulation depends on
the utilization of capacity and in which nominal wages are ¯xed. The mark-up is ¯xed and the
paradox of costs holds. In the present environment maintaining a certain pro¯t margin in adverse
circumstances is possible if an adequate restructuring of the production is undertaken f.e. through
foreign outsourcing to low wages countries. This implies to assume that both nominal wages and
mark-ups are °exible. In this way a low accumulation of capital and a low growth rates may be
compatible with a higher target rate of return and also a higher ex post realized rate of return at
least in some sectors where the new investment is concentrated.
43 Financialization and the Italian case: the e®ects of an in-
crease in the target rate of return
As we have seen in the preceding section, the empirical studies on the Italian economy we have cited
all agree that the mark-up has increased, particularly from 1992 onwards, though with di®erent
trends in di®erent productive sectors. Thus the main issues discussed in the macroeconomic literature
on ¯nancialization, namely the consequences of di®erent attitudes of managers towards retaining
pro¯ts and new issues or the wealth e®ects on consumption are not relevant in the Italian case. The
reason may be that most Italian ¯rms are small, thus they are not concerned with the problems of
middle and big corporations. Moreover the wealth e®ects on consumption have virtually vanished
after the lowering of the interest rate on debt and its sale abroad while they were important in the
seventies and the eighties. This notwithstanding, I am arguing that ¯nancialization may still be
important in the Italian case if attention is devoted to the issue of the increase in the target rate
of return, which may the consequence of the ¯nancial opening and of a di®erent sensitivity to this
issue.
In order to explain the macroeconomic consequences of an increase in the ¯nancial norm on output
growth and the rate of pro¯t I will use an old model developed by Lavoie (1995). In particular I
will draw on the so-called neo-Ricardian variation on this model. The object of Lavoie' work was
the increase in the real rate of interest on the rate of pro¯t and the growth rate of output. He uses
the sme model with a few variations to show the di®erent positions on the subject of Cambridge
theorists, Kalecki, neo-Ricardians and at the end he develops a variant that is called Minsky-Steindl.
In the tradition stemming from Cambridge and Kalecki a rise in the rate of interest should simply
lead to a fall in the rate of growth and the rate of pro¯t. Some neo-Ricardians following Sra®a's
idea that the increase in the long run rate of interest should lead to an increase in the desired rate
of pro¯t or normal rate of pro¯t argue like this, distinguishing however between the ex ante and the
ex post rate of pro¯t. At the end he develops a sort of Minsky- Steindl model where wealth e®ect
are considered and entrepreneurs are allowed to save in which it is shown that an increase in the
real rate of interest may have e®ects of di®erent type on the rate of accumulation and the rate of
pro¯t according to the values assigned to the parameters of the model.
The claim that an increase in the ¯nancial rate of return should increase the normal rate of
pro¯t in Sra®a is not based on macroeconomic considerations. Thus it is not necessary to develop a
complicated macroeconomic model to see what happens to the accumulation of capital. An increase
in the ¯nancial norm could have macroeconomic e®ects even if all the other ingredients used by Lavoie
(1995), such as the propensities to save out of pro¯ts , out of wealth and so on, were omitted from
the model. The inclusion of all these ingredients obviously change the equilibrium point between
saving and investment and may give rise to di®erent results. The tendency of the normal rate to
equate the changed rate of return on ¯nancial assets does not necessarily depend on the saving
and investment propensities of capitalists, shareholders and bondholders. It could exist even in an
economy, which is not so sophisticated from this viewpoint. Italy is a case in point. Thus in order
to see the macroeconomic e®ects of a change in the perceived rate of return on ¯nancial assets it
is not necessary to have a model in which all these di®erent propensities to save and to invest are
speci¯ed. A change in the perceived return on ¯nancial assets might have macroeconomic e®ects
even in an economy with a much simpler ¯nancial structure. For this reason I will use the most
simple model developed by Lavoie (1995) with reference to the neo-Ricardian position.
In Lavoie (1995), the Kaleckian model consists of an investment equation depending on the
di®erential between the expected rate of pro¯t and the interest rate and of a saving equation derived
from the Cambridge equation. The demand for investment depends on the expected rate of pro¯t
and on the interest rate and on a parameter ° that describes the expected future sales growth.
gi = ° + gr (re ¡ i) (1)
Where re ¡ i is the di®erence between expected rate of pro¯t and the real interest rate.
The saving equation will be equal to the Cambridge equation :
5gs = spr (2)
The combination of the equation 1 and 2 under the assumption that expected and realized pro¯t






Lavoie (1995) adds another equation, which de¯nes the pro¯t rate from the standpoint of costs.




















Pro¯ts over capital are equal to the ratio of pro¯ts to output multiplied by the ratio of output to
capacity output and to the ratio of capacity output to the stock of capital. M is the share of pro¯ts
u the rate of capacity utilization and v the capital/output ratio, assumed as given.






Lavoie then recalls that for a rate of pro¯t given by the e®ective demand constraint of equation
3 the rate of capacity utilization u depends on the margin of pro¯t m that is on the mark-up over
costs set by the ¯rms. The price is determined by the following equation:
p = (1 + µ)w/y (6)
Where p is the price level, µ the mark-up w the nominal wage rate and y the average labour





According to Kalecki's original thought, the mark-up should be ¯xed.
Lavoie (1995) reformulates this model in order to take into account the neo-Ricardian critique
and the reformulation is the following. The main objection of the Neo-ricardians is that investment
does not depend on the actual rate of pro¯t and does not depend on the interest rate but rather
investors when making their decisions look at the natural rate of pro¯t or normal rate of pro¯t. The
normal rate of pro¯t should be equal at least to the opportunity cost of alternative investments such
as the real interest rate and to the normal pro¯t of enterprise. Thus the equation for the normal
rate of pro¯t is the following:
rn = i + npe (8)
This equation may be linked to the cost-plus pricing model. In fact in target return pricing the
margin of pro¯t is set to a level that provides a normal rate of pro¯t when ¯rms produce at the





By combining the last two equations we see that :
m = m0 + mii (10)
We can see that the pro¯t margin becomes a positive function of the real interest rate.
We then de¯ne:
m0 = (npe)v/un (11)
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mi = v/un (12)
The real wage would be de¯ned by the following equation:
w/p = y (1 ¡ m) (13)
Lavoie also considers the neo-Ricardian claim that the investment function does not depend on
the current rate of pro¯t but on the normal one and replaces the investment function of the previous
model with the following:
gi = ° + gr (rn ¡ i) = ° + gr (npe) (14)
In this case the gi curv becomes a straight line (see Fiugure 1). Lavoie shows that in that case
an increase in the normal rate of pro¯t will cause a rotation downwards in the pro¯t cost curve since
the mark-up increases and even if the investment line does not move at all a fall in the utilization
of capacity occurs. The realized ex post rate of pro¯t would not change after the revision in the
normal rate of pro¯t.
If applied to the Italian case, this means that the increase in the ¯nancial norm has increased
the mark-up on costs, thus causing a fall in the realized utilization rate. The equilibrium between
saving and investment has not changed. This means that the change in the ¯nancial norm has had
no e®ect at all on the rate of growth of output and the rate of pro¯t. Of course this happens only
under the assumption that the investment equation is a straight line. If investment had been lower,
then a fall in the rate of growth of output and in the realized rate of pro¯t would have occurred (see
Figure 1 at the end of the paper).
A di®erent picture arises if we expand the same model to an open economy. An extension of this
simple model to an open economy requires that in the saving equation we take into account of the
current account of the balance of payments. In an open economy the saving investment equation is
replaced by an equation that has on the right side the sum of investment and the current account
balance. If we assume, as usual, that the current account depends on the level of the real exchange
rate we get the following equation for savings:
gs = spr + CA(h) (15)
The real exchange rate h is de¯ned as the ratio of the nominal exchange rate multiplied by the





We assume as in the preceding model that mark-up is ¯xed and not °exible and is exogenously
determined by the conditions on ¯nancial markets. Thus we do not assume that domestic ¯rms
pro¯tability depends positively on the exchange rate. If the exchange rate appreciates domestic
¯rms do not reduce their mark-up in order to maintain competitiveness. This contrasts with other
views on the issue of mark-up and competitiveness (see Blecker 1989) but it re°ects closely the
behaviour of Italian exporting ¯rms (see Bugamelli, Tedeschi 2007).
Now we see graphically the consequences of a higher target rate of return and of a nominal
appreciation. We observe that the saving curve goes up thus decreasing the rate of pro¯t ex post,
while the rise in the mark-up makes the price cost margin curve PC rotate downwards (see Figure
2 at the end of the paper).
In the case, in which, the target rate of return is raised and a nominal appreciation occur, the
saving curve should shift on the left because of the lower value of e, the nominal exchange rate,
and the higher value of P, the price of domestic goods. This amounts to a real appreciation of the
domestic currency. In a closed economy, instead, under these conditions, an increase in the target
mark-up would have only led to a decrease in capacity utilization while the rate of pro¯t ex post
would have stayed constant. In fact, if we assume that the investment line does not move the higher
7desired target rate of return will only a®ect utilization of capacity but it will not lower the realized
pro¯t rate. The e®ect of an appreciation would be a fall in the rate of pro¯t (see Figure 2). The ¯nal
result of a constant rate of growth and an unchanged rate of pro¯t , though with lower utilization
rate, does not ¯t well the current situation of the Italian economy as we have seen in the last section.
In fact the rate of pro¯t has increased while the rate of growth has decreased.
The reason why this model does not ¯t the Italian situation may be linked to some weakness in
its main assumptions. In particular the model assumes that an increase in the target rate of return
causes a rise in the rate of pro¯t on all investment, including that made in the past, rather than on
new investment only. Lavoie (1995) asserts that the normal rate has nothing to do with the realized
ex post rate of pro¯t and therefore it is used as a substitute for the mark-up that ¯rms impose on
variable costs. Once the normal rate of pro¯t has been revised, the mark-up in the whole economy
must increase and thus the real wage and the utilization rate must fall. A radical objection to this
interpretation is that the normal rate of pro¯t is the return that new investment should carry in
order to be made. If ¯rms would decide to invest more, according to their expectations of future
sales or whatever else, they would require in normal conditions under normal capacity utilization a
rate of return at least equal to the revised normal rate.
It is di®erent however to argue that ¯rms will impose a higher mark-up on costs, other things
being equal, only because they have revised their normal rate upwards. A more sensible interpreta-
tion would be that ¯rms would plan their future investment in such a way as to reach that higher
rate of pro¯t. Besides this, it is unlikely that ¯rms raise their mark-up without experiencing losses
in realized sales and then in ex post pro¯ts. Moreover, the idea of the mark-up does not mean that
they may only increase prices to get a higher pro¯t margin, they may decrease costs as well or plan
to organize the production in a di®erent way to get the same result (see Sawyer and Shapiro 2003).
Prices neither are determined by costs nor determine them.
\The prices of the ¯rm are not given with the costs of its products, nor are they determined by
the demand for them. Prices do not necessarily change with the demand for products just as they do
not necessarily change with the costs, and they do not do so for the same reason: the price changes
may not be in the interests of the ¯rm." (Sawyer and Shapiro 2003 p.358.)
While it is likely that the revision in the normal rate of pro¯t may a®ect future investment
decision, it is, however, not warranted that the increase in the mark-up may be applied to current
production. The Italian case shows a marked increase in the weight of the services sector in the
value added. This tendency however is common to all industrialized countries and thus may not be
connected to the ¯nancialization. The peculiarity of the Italian case however is the increasing weight,
over the value added of the private services, of some industries. These industries, telecommunications
¯nance transport, have been privatized and, after that , both their pro¯ts and the valuation of their
shares have increased. New investment in those industries could be undertaken only because they
were privatized. In order to purchase them it had been necessary to buy their shares on the market.
Once acquired, the investment strategy pricing and all the other organization issues could have been
decided ex novo by the new owners. Often owners and managers were the same persons. The price
elasticity of demand for utilities is also not very high. Moreover the strategy of the new owners may
not have been focussed on long term growth but rather on pro¯table re-selling after a short period
(see the Telecom case). In this case the capital gain on future sales would have been higher, the
higher the increase in the valuation of shares.
4 An alternative story: monopoly power, classical competi-
tion and ¯nancialization.
An alternative explanation of the changes in the distribution of income in Italy and of the evolution
of the macroeconomic aggregates could be based on a model, in which mark-up pricing co-exists with
classical competition (see Dutt 1995, Dutt 1997). In this model, the rate of growth of output would
8depend on the rate of capital utilization (average) and on the rate of pro¯t. Thus the accumulation
of capital would depend on the utilization and pro¯t. The allocation of a given capital among
sectors would depend instead upon the pro¯t rate di®erentials among sectors. The last feature
would reintroduce some form of classical competition in the model. There is a mechanism, however,
which ensures in the long run equalization of pro¯t rates and convergence to the steady state rate
of growth. The rate of growth is de¯ned as follows:
g = (g1K1 + g2K2)=(K1 + K2) = ¿0 + ¯1u + ¯2r (17)
Where
u = (P1/P2)
0 u1k1 + u2k2 (18)
And
r = r1k1 + r2k2 (19)
Where
ui = Xi/Ki;ki = Ki/K1 + K2 (20)
And (P1/P2)
0 is the initial price ratio.
If the allocation of investment between sectors is governed by the pro¯t rate di®erential:
g1 ¡ g2 = ¹(r1 ¡ r2) (21)
In the short run, given the stocks of capital, the market for each good clear through output
adjustments. In the long run the stocks of capital in the two sectors change. Of course if there is no
possibility of free entry in the second sector the pro¯t rates in the long run would not be equalized.
The implications of the model are the following, according Dutt (1995). The relative price
both in the short run and in the long run is determined by the each sector's degree of monopoly
and by technical parameters. This would be in contrast to the classical approach where prices
are determined assuming equalized rates of pro¯t, given input-output relations and distributional
parameters. In this type of model the allocation of capital among sectors would depend on the
relative pro¯tability of the sectors and the movement of capital would produce in the long run the
equalization of pro¯t rates. In this case no change in the target rate of return would be necessary
to explain the trends in the accumulation of capital, output growth and the distribution of income.
The pro¯t rate di®erential would be su±cient to cause the higher rate of growth in newly privatized
sectors with respect to old industrial sectors. In this case however no equalization of pro¯t rates
would be attainable even if free capital mobility is assumed. The reason is that the sector with
higher returns are monopolistic ones, this means that there are barriers to entry. The only thing
that can be done is to purchase a stake in it in order to control them. The attempt to purchase
them would only cause a rise in the prices of their shares and thus in the value of the value of their
capital in the stock exchange. The rate of pro¯t in some sectors could be persistently higher than
in other sectors and higher than the average rate of growth.
Conclusions
I have recalled some stylized facts regarding the Italian economy. In particular, in the last twenty
years, the rate of pro¯t and the share of pro¯t have gone up, output growth and investment have
slowed down and the export share has fallen. We have discussed whether the decline of the Italian
economy could be linked to the ¯nancialization process. Usually the literature on ¯nancialization
focuses on changes in the investment attitude of corporations like the increase in distributed divi-
dends and the fall in the new issue of share. I have argued that, even in a country where all these
things have happened partially and later than in the rest of the world, ¯nancialization may have
deep e®ects by changing the perceived ¯nancial norm. If this ¯nancial norm a®ects the target return
9on capital, macroeconomic e®ects may be very important even without explicitly taking into account
all the other things.
By drawing on a model by Lavoie (1995), I have shown that an increase in the target rate of
return would leave unchanged the rate of accumulation, the rate of growth and the realized rate of
pro¯t while decreasing the capacity utilization. If we extend the same model to an open economy
and assume that an appreciation of the currency occurs, a fall in the rate of growth, accumulation
and in the realized rate of pro¯t would follow. This picture, however, does not ¯t in well with the
stylized facts mentioned above. In Italy, the rate of growth and the capital accumulation have slowed
down while the rate of pro¯t and the pro¯t share have clearly increased. The increase concerns the
average pro¯t share and the average pro¯t rate while indeed that the pro¯t rate is declining in
the manufacturing sectors and is rising in the services sector. The pro¯t rate is declining in the
manufacturing sector, due to the increase in ¯xed costs for a more rapid replacement of the old
capital stock. This decline would not depend on the utilization rate.
At this point a di®erent interpretation is presented, which is no more based on the ¯nancialization
hypothesis but rather on the increase in the degree of monopoly in the Italian industrial sectors,
given the increase in the mark-up. This process would have been favoured by the privatization
process of previously public enterprises. We show what might have happened by using a model by
Dutt (1995) with two sectors. The stock of capital is ¯xed in the short run while the rate of growth
depends on the total utilization of capacity and the average rate of pro¯t. In the long run, however,
while the accumulation of capital is still governed by aggregate utilization and pro¯tability, the
allocation of capital among sectors and their growth depends on the pro¯t rate di®erential. In the
steady state, this di®erential would tend to zero. In reality, if there are barriers to entry or limited
possibilities of expansion in the higher pro¯t sectors, this does not need to happen. The only thing
that has happened is the attempt to purchase stakes in those industries, which in turn has increased
the value of their shares, so satisfying the objectives of their managers. In this case, ¯nancialization
would be a side e®ect of the increase in monopolistic competition.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium between saving and investment (upper part of the graph) and price cost margin 
equation (lower part ) in Lavoie (1995). 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium between saving and investment  and price cost margin equation in an open economy 
after an  appreciation  of the currency.  
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